


# India and the NPT: Hostile Opposition or Grudging Acceptance

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# Three reasons for India's Disengagement

1. China Threat Theory (Karnad, Chengappa)
1. Nuclear Security Guarantees (Kennedy, Sarkar)
2. Great Power coalitions/ nuclear apartheid (Perkovich)


## Major Arguments

- No consensus on the Chinese threat
- NPT would isolate China/ constrain its weapons program
- Nuclear Security Guarantees implicit in Cold War politics
- NPT a symbol of détente



# Threats as Opportunities and Risks

- Threat perception and response depends upon two factors: what are your past beliefs and how you assess future stakes.
- For political decision-makers like Shastri, Nehruvian idealism is reinforced by high domestic costs of the bomb project. Major political, social and economic risks.
- The scientific enclave: a culture of organisational ambition reinforced by favourable changes in domestic and international opinion.
- Military was interested in a conventional build-up: an organisational response to the 1962 China war and the military modernisation that followed. Nuclear weapons were a distraction.



# Nuclear Security Guarantees

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- Contradictory impulses of the political leadership and the scientific enclave
- Nuclear Security Guarantees: political leadership's way out from the bomb conundrum

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

Fully conscious of the hazards of a nuclear war,

Deeply concerned with the fact that non-nuclear States, in increasing numbers, might come to acquire and develop nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology and thereby enhance the dangers of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Being aware of the need to limit the number of States possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology,

Convinced that any increase in the number of nuclear powers is a source of grave concern and apprehension to non-nuclear powers, particularly those who are parties to the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty,

Conscious of their responsibilities as Permanent Members of the Security Council and as nuclear powers,

Desirous of strengthening the purposes and principles of the United Nations and contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognising the imperative need of continuing efforts under the auspices of the United Nations toward the conclusion of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament at the earliest possible

day, the of 1965,

Following Declaration:

This Declaration collectively

- Shastri's gambit inspired much more by domestic political considerations rather than any concrete security threat from China
- Initially, India preferred unilateral declarations jointly made by the US, the UK and the USSR over a binding treaty such as the NPT.
- Not specifically aimed at India but for all nuclear powers; the nonalignment trap.
- Principal opposition came from Moscow: US will entrench itself in the Indian Ocean.
- NPT became an alternative arrangement for institutionalising such guarantees

5. The proposal for nuclear protection was originally made to neutralise pressure on the Government to go in for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and also to help check the tendency towards the spread of these weapons. The questions forwarded by the Lok Sabha Secretariat indicate that there is considerable anxiety about this matter. The questions reveal a desire to know what progress has been made on our proposal and more specifically the reactions of the major nuclear powers and of non-nuclear powers in Asia and Africa to our proposal. Certain questions seem to suggest that the Anglo-American nuclear umbrella is a proposition on which we are working. In view of the complexity of the problem and the interest Parliament is taking in it, it would certainly be of advantage for the Government to make a comprehensive statement which would obviate

Lok Sabha Secretariat placed below. We have already received advance notice of one Parliament question which *inter alia* deals with the question of nuclear protection to non-nuclear States. The factual position in this regard has been intimated to the Lok Sabha Secretariat.


2. The present position is that our proposal for joint assurances of security to non-nuclear countries by the Soviet Union and the United States has made no progress principally because the Soviet Union has categorically rejected the idea for the present and also because the United States does not favour any joint responsibility with the Soviet Union in this matter in the present context. Though Britain, Canada, Australia and certain other Western countries favour the idea of nuclear protection to non-nuclear States, they have no answer to the question as to how the Soviet Union can be persuaded to participate in such an arrangement. Their suggestions are, therefore, of no particular practical significance since we are not interested in unilateral guarantees. Nigeria is the only non-aligned country which has somewhat vaguely supported the proposal for nuclear guarantees. On the other hand, Nepal has sharply criticized our proposal while the UAR has been guarded to the point of being skeptical about it. The other non-aligned countries, which are the non-nuclear powers really concerned about nuclear protection, have maintained a studied silence on this question and the impression appears to be that they are not particularly enthusiastic about it. In the meantime, Pakistan has been carrying on a vicious campaign against our proposal.

3. Recent discussions I have had with Soviet officials here points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is not only unlikely to change its attitude but that it feels that our continued subscription to this idea is strengthening the case for the United States to consolidate its nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean area on the pretext of offering nuclear protection to India (and other countries). The possibility of some joint action by the two major nuclear powers, ... out of the question for the ...

- 1966 Leadership change
- Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister; Vikram Sarabhai as Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- No progress on the bomb
- Kosygin proposal: negative security guarantees



- Vikram Sarabhai once again opened the dialogue on nuclear security guarantees
- India could not extract guarantees but no major movement on the bomb
- Indian assessment: guarantees implicit in the Cold War politics
- Risk in Beijing's strategic calculations rather than the certainty of response, whether from India or from Great Powers



# NPT as Detente

- Lessons of 1962 War: Cuban Missile Crisis, Great Power dissonance and China's opportunism, Henceforth, India's objective was to isolate China
- 1963: India proposed joint conventional guarantees from US and USSR
- Insofar NPT represents the process of Détente, India has to participate in the treaty.
- Great Power dictum or Great Power consensus
- New Delhi had to restrain its hostility; no decision on the bomb.

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Brief on Government's stand on the resolution by Shri Virbadra Singh, M.P. for discussion in the House on 17th April, 1970.

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The resolution submitted by Shri Virbadra Singh, M.P., reads:

"This House recommends to the Government to immediately undertake a programme of manufacture of nuclear bomb in the interest of national security."

The Government of India is opposed to undertake a programme of manufacturing nuclear bombs because this would not be in the interests of national security.

1. The threat from Chinese strategic nuclear weapons;

Vis-a-vis China, we have to consider China's own programme in the field of nuclear weapons. China is known to be developing a 'strategic nuclear weapons system' involving hydrogen warheads and a long range missile delivery system. If there is no military reason for China to use its nuclear weapons against India and this would be difficult to identify, China can be deterred from using its strategic nuclear capability if India had a strategic capability of its own. This involves unacceptable risks to the Chinese Government of the strategic capability of a third country like the USSR. We can discuss separately