Goal of the research

This research team was founded in an attempt to understand the international consensus on nuclear proliferation that emerged in the period 1966-68 as the nuclear “system of 1968.”
 
Read the NPT brief:

In the year 1968,
after 10 years of negotiations, the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signatures. It has since become the most widely accepted multilateral treaty on arms limitation, with 191 signatories. Until it reached its final version though, it had to go through many twists and turns. The biggest issue in the final stages of the negotiations was the problem of nuclear sharing of NATO. From the standpoint of the Soviet Union, the U.S. allowing access to other NATO members to its nuclear weapons was a type of nuclear proliferation.

During the 1950s,
only the U.S., the Soviet Union and the U.K. had nuclear weapons. However, in the wake of the 60s, it was feared that nuclear powers would increase rapidly throughout the world. The countries closest to becoming a nuclear power were thought to be: West Germany, France, Japan, China, India and others. Furthermore, the technological advancements of the delivery sytems of the nuclear weapons during the late 1950s had a great impact on strategies. After the Sputnik Shock of 1957, and following the start of the ballistic missile era, the U.S. had become part of the nuclear strike range of the Soviet Union.

“Would America sacrifice New York for Paris or Berlin?”

In October 1957,
Sputnik 1, the world’s first artificial satellite was launched successfully by the Soviet Union. This signaled the start of the era of mutual deterrence. The nuclear guarantee of the United States suddenly seemed less credible. Would the U.S. sacrifice New York for the sake of Paris or Berlin. France chose to acquire its own nuclear deterrent. Its decision to step out of NATO’s integrated military structure was partly motivated by its desire to possess an independent right of decision over the use of its nuclear deterrent. However, the rest of NATO countries decided to settle for a common and integrated defense. After a decade of agonizing negotiations, what they came up with was a combination of bilateral nuclear sharing arrangements with the U.S., coupled with an intense nuclear consultation in the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO, set up in late 1966. The decision was also coupled with the adoption of the Harmel Report on the future of the alliance, and of the strategy of flexible response next year.

The NPT
Was signed in 1968. This, together with the above mentioned political-strategic arrangements within NATO, it seems to form a cluster of decisions take between 1966-1968, which we name ‘the system of 1968.’ It was an arms control policy decision, but it also involved military-strategic choices for all the participating countries, especially the non-nuclear countries. They chose to enter this nuclear control regime, because they thought it gave them a better political-strategic deal, than acquiring a national nuclear deterrent. Understanding the choices made by NATO’s non-nuclear members in the years 1966-1968, is crucial in order to understand the nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime today. The NPT was a topic for arms control/disarmament and peace research scholars, but not necessarily for military-strategic scholars. But we consider that both approaches are necessary to understand the nature of the ‘system of 1968.’
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Similarly, any discussion on nuclear security should involve three issue fields: The nuclear weapons issue, the nuclear proliferation issue and the subject of peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, there have been no research projects as of now trying to integrate these fields. This research group argues that it is necessary to understand these subject in an integrated way.
We therefore attempt to bring together researchers from different fields, in order to better understand the problem complex. Our effort is multi-disciplinary as well as multi-national.